Thursday, May 17, 2007

My Article Finally Made It On Line

This is hardly what I'd call high-profile. But at least one of the editors read it. Have a gander.

A Goat is A Goat is A Goat:
No Narrative in "New Narrative"


Online Exclusive / Posted May 9, 2007

But do we really need art criticism? It occurred to me while attending a recent exhibit at the Salt Lake Art Center, that the answer is yes. In "New Narrative: Warhol, Stella, Marden, Fitzpatrick,” I was surprised to see the works of very different artists presented as if they were all variations on a single theme - narrative. But where, in the midst of what struck me as a forced conjunction of austere mono-prints, slick poster-Pop, playful collages and Mexican lottery tickets, was the unifying narrative, or for that matter, any narrative at all?

I do not demand either unity or narrative from art. I am aware that beginning with Robert Rauschenberg's "combines" of the mid-50s, the art world gleefully abandoned its high-modernist pretensions to stylistic unity, and turned to experimentation with hybrids. Artists began to mix and match, juxtapose and provoke, promote direct political action as well as communal interaction. Gone were the good old days of abstract expressionism. Gone were Jackson Pollock, Franz Kline and Mark Rothko - artists who sought to produce godlike presences, icons of themselves. Instead, postmodern artists pandered spectacle and theatricality. This new wave of artists cashed in their stock in the genuinely rare and came instead to value the rarity, the novelty, the curiosity, whatever was simply quirky and hip. Where the unique and original once was, now there is the popular and the copy.

This decisive turning point was identified with great clarity by renowned art scholar Michael Fried. In his landmark essay of 1962, "Art and Objecthood," Fried declares painting to be on the verge of exhaustion. And Frank Stella (amongst other key painters such as Kenneth Noland, Morris Louis and Jules Olitski), Fried proclaims, is the chosen one who will either save painting or die trying. Fried identifies painting’s enemies as a new group of artists (Tony Smith, Donald Judd, Carl Andre) known as the minimalists, or literalists. These artists cheerfully reject the old Renaissance tradition that paintings are windows to imaginary worlds. Instead of paintings or even traditional sculptures, they sought deliberately to produce mere objects, brute and banal cylinders and cubes that simplely get in the way. Gazing in rapt admiration upon such chunks of wood and stone would be as misguided a response as admiring the aesthetic qualities of a parking stall or a traffic pylon.

The genius of Stella's breakthrough paintings, at least as far as Fried is concerned, lies in their ability to present powerfully compelling abstract images, while at the same time never denying the fact that these images rely upon physical supports, the very real boards or canvases they're painted on. Stella's images consist of nested squares or nestled wedges, whose shape is entirely determined by the shape of the canvas. Here, image and support mutually imply and sustain one another, producing the effect of perfect simultaneity. They can be fully seen and perfectly understood in a single instant of intuition. And where there is no time, there can be no stories.

Now, let me turn to the show up for discussion: New Narratives. In looking at the Warhol prints in his Ten Famous Jews from the 20th Century series, I can't help but notice their close resemblance to Picasso's portraits and neo-classical drawings from the 20s and 30s. Then I turn specifically to the portrait of Gertrude Stein, which had it not been conveniently labeled I might well have taken for a portrait of Julius Caesar. Stein was one of Picasso's closest friends and the subject of one of his most famous paintings. Warhol is obviously quoting Picasso, but not in subject matter alone. The bold patches of color unmistakably recall Picasso's use of real scraps of wallpaper in his drawings to signify texture, depth, and shadow and light. More important however, is Warhol's use of rapidly drawn outlines. These mark out only the most essential features of his subjects, and give the drawings the look of the ancient Greek or Etruscan vases, which Picasso admired. Warhol, in swiftly tracing over photographic images, is glibly quoting Picasso's neo-classical style.

Picasso turned deliberately toward myth, in particular the wild transformation stories from Ovid's Metamorphoses, in order to counter the growing belief that as a cubist he was trying to cultivate a style, which was perfectly timeless, which had nothing to do with narrative. Warhol, on the other hand, in total opposition to Picasso, strategically pirates the master's style, and uses it, insolently, to produce a series of bust shots, which have all the gravitas of collector’s-edition Big Gulp cups. Warhol has expunged all depth, narrative and history from his images of modern mythical figures. He produces neither archetypes nor ambivalent dream images, but simply multiple prints of celebrities. Certainly we are shown the classicized faces of important Jews, both men and women. But Jews here are completely dissociated from anything that might allude to their actual historical achievements. Images of Einstein, Gertrude Stein and Justice Brandeis are placed on equal footing, or better said, given equal billing, with Sarah Bernhardt and The Marx Brothers. Rather than for founding states, splitting atoms, or interpreting the law, these Jews are famous simply for being Jewish. Here, greatness is stripped of all grandeur, the heroic stripped of mighty deeds. Fashion photographer that he is, Warhol mechanically copies (again, by literally tracing faces marked by "Roman" noses) the superficial characteristics of classicism. But what he admires is not any inner spirit so much as a deathly coolness. And there the issue ends. There is no story.

As for Frank Stella's contribution to the show, his 11 illustrations of Had Gadya, the shows brochure informs us, are based on an earlier series of prints by Russian artist El Lissitzky. Now, Had Gayda is a traditional Passover song, usually sung to help keep children awake and amused during the nighttime vigil. The song, which is literally about a baby goat, operates on the same principle as "I Know An Old Lady Who Swallowed A Fly." Originally, the patently absurd lyric had no particular significance. Soon enough however, clever scholars, searching for interpretive fodder, insisted the story must mean something more. Thus began the effort to interpret a nonsense rhyme symbolically, allegorically: "the goat clearly represent the chosen people, and so obviously the hungry cat that eats the goat represents.. yiddle-diddle-dee, yiddle--diddle-dum (acknowlegements and apologies to Susan Sontag and Sarah Silverman).

Now, Lissitzky was a student of the deeply religious Suprematist painter Kasimir Malevich, and he may very well have been drawn to the idea that cryptic meanings could have been encoded within the words of a children's song. His illustrations of the song in fact resemble the mystical fantasies of Marc Chagall far more than the crisp graphic designs usually associated with him, and they certainly seem to share in the spirit of Jewish mystical allegory. But Stella's prints, on the other hand, conceive of allegory in a completely different manner. Here, rather than understanding allegories as images with a symbolic meaning in excess of what they immediately show, allegory is instead completely emptied and flattened. Allegory, for Stella, means simply an image, which cannot be seen and understood (as Fried would have wanted) in a single instant. Allegories are those images, which, by virtue of there of excessive busyness, glitter, splash and hybridity, require the viewer to perceive them in pieces and over time. The goat in Had Gadya, according to Stella's view of things, is neither more meaningful or less literal than the salvaged goat in Robert Rauschenberg's notorious Monogram. Stella's allegory is depleted of all allegoricity, which is to say emptied of all spirituality and meaning, and emptied of all narrative.

As for the other two artists represented in the show, Brice Marden and Tony Fitzpatrick, their work, like Stella's, makes sense to me insofar as it experiments not so much with narrative as with the notion of the support. Though Marden and Fitzpatrick work in very different styles, their medium, at least in the pieces on display in this show, is the same. Both artists use printed etching to produce works whose graphic quality possesses not the commercial slickness of Warhol so much as that of a deliberate craftsman such as Rembrandt. The actual marks they make, rather than suggesting a photographer's grease pencil, attest to their use of the engraver's metal burin.

A further attribute of their work, derivative of the printing process, is the presence of square embossments. One can see here how the pressure applied to the print surface has left a shallow relief, which surrounds and frames the images. In the highly austere, and to my eye highly sensitive, series of unnamed prints by Brice Marden, this slight but unmissable trace of the production process is fully integrated into the image and functions to create the effect of a window through which the viewer is invited to look. The flatness ordinarily associated with graphic work is thus suspended, at least momentarily, and one feels oneself returned to the visual space of abstract painting.

This effect is powerfully reinforced through other compositional means employed in Marden's prints. The series begins with images composed of simple horizontal lines and textured bars, unmistakably evocative of horizon and sky. These are examples of a printer working with the vocabulary of landscape. Approaching and retreating from the images allows the viewer to elicit differing visual effects from the prints, suggestive either of the atmospheric depth, which I have already mentioned, or of the flatness normally associated with a print.

Once this set of expectations, or codes of viewing, has been established in the first prints, Marden then proceeds, in the following images, to frustrate the viewer's ability to play with these effects, by multiplying the number of horizontals and exchanging them for verticals. The viewer is left, then, with a series of visual utterances employing the basic vocabulary of landscape, though no longer adhering to the conventions of landscape's visual grammar. To view the later prints in Marden's series is feel the window, or perhaps door, the artist had opened for us in an initial gesture of welcome, and which he had allowed us freely to adjust, to begin, with an ever-increasing amount of pressure, gradually to close. They shut us out and shut vision down.

That there is a motivation behind this sequence of images is hard to doubt. But that mere sequence amounts to a veritable narrative seems far less certain. Overtly experimental as Marden's prints are, it seems unreasonable that we should be expected to see them in narrative terms any more than we would be justified in reading narrative into a series of blood tests. There may indeed be a real human story behind the elevated level of toxins found in my blood stream at a given moment, or my decreasing ability to read an eye chart. But seen strictly from the perspective of experimental medicine, all that matters are visible effects and their demonstrable causes. Here, once again, there is no narrative.

Finally, I want to turn to the work of Tony Fitzpatrick. This very contemporary artist offers a series of prints, which in a nod to the baroque philosopher Blaise Pascal, is called “The Infinite Wager.” Fitzpatrick’s prints also integrate the embossed trace of the printing press into the image itself. But in this instance the effect is quite different from that achieved in Marden. Fitzpatricks’s compositions, which combine elements of cartoon, bathroom graffiti and third world devotional art, are emphatically flat; they make no reference, not even a negative one as in Marden, to easel painting. Instead, they announce themselves as the work of an amateur or primitive. Which is why I must chuckle, not at, but with the Fitzpatrick, when he archly advertises himself as “fine artist.”

In embracing the naïve, Fitzpatrick’s work shows a certain affinity with Warhol. In place of Andy’s cool interest in glamour though these pieces derive what little mystique they have, from Fitzpatrick’s postmodern appropriation of the vernacular of folk art, superstition, white-trash culture – skulls, devils, serpents, pinup girls, whiskey bottles and playing cards. Of course, this repertoire of images is the stock in trade of prison art. And consequently I want to read the embossing in these images, the visible trace of the press, as evoking the pressure entailed in producing a tattoo. Here the engraver’s burin is metaphorically transformed into the skin artist’s needle.

It would be almost impossible to look at Fitzpatrick’s prints without having images of old school flash-art come to mind. What distinguishes Fitzpatrick’s images drastically from real tattoos, and simultaneously lessens their impact, is the obvious fact that they are not pricked into skin but instead pressed onto paper. In the same way that their iconography can not be taken literally but instead displays a sense of ironic detachment (for clearly the artist’s interest in games of chance reflects not a belief in metaphysical Fate but rather in simple accident and coincidence), the intense pressure indicated by the printing mark refers not to any painful bodily ordeal but simply a physical process undergone by an inanimate substance. Paper may indeed be a kind of tissue, but it is certainly not a sensitive living membrane. At the same time Fitzpatrick offers us superstition emptied of all belief, he simultaneously offers us images of experience emptied of all ordeal, which is to say “experience” emptied of all experience – either in terms of a painful event commemorated with a tattoo, or the actual pain produced by repeated jabs from a needle.

Or, even if we do choose to feel some vague pathos in Fitzpatrick's use of paper as surrogate skin, it is still not possible to read the random assemblage of assorted images as the result of any purposive process. The living body here would offer itself not as a surface bearing monumental inscriptions so much as a simple scratch pad or bulletin board - the kind of outrageous absurdity depicted in the Christopher Nolan film Memento, whose traumatized protagonist is decidedly handicapped when it comes to forming coherent narratives. Image this same film, but without the precipitating crime, and you have the art of Tony Fitzpatrick. Rather than creating and playing with the idea of depth, the stamping marks in Fitzpatrick's pieces, then, emphasize their absolute superficiality. If narrative, to function as narrative, requires some kind of stakes, the stakes in "Infinite Wager" strike me as decidedly, if not infinitely, low.

Certainly we all do, and should, see art in our own unique and powerful ways. However, it seems to me that our response to art is never so powerful or significant as it is in those moments of insight when we not only know we like something but also suddenly find ourselves able to explain, to others, and ourselves what precise quality in a work of art has captured our mind or imagination. In these statements, the work suddenly takes on an increased meaning and reality for us. And so we should be careful in how we talk about works of art, because the words we use to talk about them soon become an actual part of them. Criticism is not an individual activity. It can only function properly in communities in which statements are frequently exchanged and opinions revised. If these conditions are not met criticism does not disappear; it hardens into dogma, while opinion turns into mere claptrap. We become so accustomed to using certain fashionable words, narrative being just one of them, that we begin finding an opportunity to use them anywhere, and cease questioning their appropriateness when we hear them, or see them brightly printed onto free brochures.

Wednesday, May 16, 2007

Electric Guitar

The new metal dude in the building would definitely benefit from a dozen or so lessons, at least. I don't suppose anybody will be writing an ode on his playing any day soon. Rock on, dude. Just not so loud.

The Neighbor

[Stringed instrument], are you following me?
In how many distant cities has your
lonely night already spoken to mine?
Are a hundred playing you? Or just one?

Are there in all the great cities of the world
those, who without you, would have
already lost themselves in the rivers?
And why does it always have to concern me?

Why am I always the neighbor of those
who in fear force you to sing
and to say: The heaviness of life
is heavier than the heaviness of all things.


You gotta think too about the importance for Badiou not only of mathematical and propositional logic, but also of poetry and the novel. Because for him everything comes down to writing as Event. Hence his fascination with the perfect specificity of creative utterance (Mallarme), as well as the duration, or Spinozist endeavor, of the labor of production (Beckett). For him there is an ontology not just of books but also the sentence. Woolf, working out of Russell, incorporates this into her novels, which read as adventures in narrativity. Whereas in Beckett the sweetness and light of Woolf's "house of being," derived from Russell's logical atomism, yields to a new dynamic of narration, more Wittgensteinian and even less compromising. Here, narrative functions as a differential machine, struggling to continue as it slowly grinds itself to a halt.

"I Can't Go On, I'll Go On."



(click image for video)

Tuesday, May 15, 2007

"They're Just Like You and Me!"

Despite what certain anthropologist might say, to my mind almost nothing "discovered" by the new biology disproves anything Marx said. Rather, Marxist social critique allows us to see the extent to which today's most "cutting-edge" and "objective" science is still tremendously, and unconsciously, informed by bourgeois ideology - in particular the myth of the modern couple and nuclear family as "natural, right, God-ordained and time-honored" social institutions. No matter how far back into human origins we excavate, everything we find always seems to look like little more than a slightly shaggier, or more savage version of Norman Rockwell. This sort of narcissistic projection is one of the principal reasons Marx found it imperitive to destroy (which is to say, debunk the myth of) Nature, beginning with Human Nature.



This is exactly what I was talking about in these earlier posts:

How are the Museum and the University changed if we begin to think of them not in common-sense terms as a containers holding contents, but rather as spaces created out of dis-contents, which is to say ideological orders composed out of an array of signs? Museums, and the Historical-Survey courses and the specialized disciplines and objective sciences we are trained in at college, and especially the signs and labels within them; all exist for our pacificatory reassurance. And yet, from a more brutal perspective, or perhaps simply that of the cultural outsider, what if we were to consider the Museum and the University as kinds of murder weapons. This startling view opens before us the moment we begin to see that signs and labels veritably constitute the Museum and cientific Truth themselves. Science is nothing but an order of signs. And signs always mitigate, mediate our fear of the unknown. As Hegel said, the name is the murder of the actual thing. Thus the importance of naming, labelling and functionalizing all contents within museums, canonical literature and university courses. Labels in museums and textbooks never scream. But they gently put their arm around us and whisper softly in our ears, This is really that.

One of the most salient points of Timothy Lenoir's essay "The Naturalized History Museum" (click) is to suggest that, for better or worse, the primary, if not the ultimate function of museums, is to convert things into signs. Which is precisely why he invokes the discipline of semiotics, the study of signs and how they function to create an artificial nature. It is the return of the repressed, the reappearance of the corpse, which is one of the best ways to reveal how signs kill reality, and how what we perceive to be nature is in fact an arbitrary and often violent cultural imposition. If you follow this, then you will be able to see how suddenly this Gober piece below, which to most people would look just plain weird, is actually quite readable, and in fact makes perfect sense.



Robert Gober - American
Museum Installation (1992)

~

Here's a link to E.T.A Hoffmann's classic narrative of "otherness," "The Sandman": (click!) If you read it, or just follow my writings, you'll see how Marx, though highly indebted to Kantian dialectical thought, nevertheless attempts to move beyond it by identifying within it an residual fetishism (a powerful believe in the personal agency of inanimate objects). The fetishist, by clinging to a utopian myths of a primordial state of original wholeness (such as the belief in an un-castrated phallic mother), as well as to the objects which represent to him that state of lost plenitude, furnishes himself with an alibi - a disavowal or false resolution of the fundamental contradiction of sexual difference.

Perhaps I'm just going out on a limb here, but what if there really were a moral to the story in Hoffmann's "The Sandman"? Suppose that Nathaniel really is suffering from some sort of primordially repressed trauma, one he is doomed to repeat indefinitely, and escapes only through self-destruction. The strange and unfortunate events of his college days, then, are just a repetition of a childhood trauma. And these childhood fears in turn, as I said in class, for all that they are understandable, nevertheless seem themselves to be insufficiently motivated by the child Nathaniel's situation and history. One could re-construct behind Nathaniel's traumatic encounter with Coppelius a dim primal scence in which he was first deprived of a beloved object, most likely a doll which was snatched from him and shattered before his eyes. The moral of the story is not that we shouldn't fall in love with dolls, but rather that we should admit and accept that loving a doll is as close to true Love as we're ever going to get. At least as far as Nathaniel is concerned, at first we can say that he made a mistake by preferring Olympia to Clara. But when we go back and read the narrator's description of Clara (her deep swimmingpool eyes and empty sense of silent detachment, as well as her immediate lack of other more apparent charms) we begin to realize what love actually is, and perhaps also why Kant chose to remain a bachelor. To fall in love, at least for Kant, is never to fall in love with the person immediately before you, but rather with the lack and emptiness deep within them, one which reflects your own inner sense of primordial loss.

But, again, why should that bother him so much unless this incident too was merely a repetition of an even prior loss. Are not these also repetition of an even prior traums, one completely inaccessible to Nathanial's memory specifically because his very Memory (the consistent story which represents his entire Biography) is in fact nothing but a story he himself has created as a rationalization and defense against the trauma of coming into Being in the first place. Everyting happens "as if" some utterly inscrutable event or intention were directing his life from a realm beyond our comprehension, as if some inaccessible force were warping his entire reality, were bending the very fabric of Time and Space into a loop of recurrences centered around a lack. What we see in Nathaniel's case, then, is an odd and disturbing fascination with Life (recall that he is a Biology student), but behind this an even deeper and more compelling fascination with something utter unknow lurking behind Life. The figure of Olympia would then appear as that beautiful object, which because of the uncanny way in which it stands poised at the border between Life and Death, between the Animate and the Inanimate; allows Nathaniel to contemplate and engage his primary interests, which are Death and (Self-)Destruction, but always from a safe remove.

What the Uncanny, and Kant's philosophy as well, allows us to see, is that we are always strangers in this world, that our true identity and home lies somewhere we can not go and can not even remember. Our only access to our true selves is through the pure force of Reason, which is no longer simply a set of operations which can be used in order to distinguish right from wrong, and true from false. Rather, Reason, in the Kantian sense, is an active and seemingly alien force (or conscience) operating from somewhere deep within us always reminding us that the world of appearance is not our true home, and that the only way to make the world into an home for ourselves is by paying strict attention to an alien and contentless Voice and sense of Duty which seems inexplicably to come to us from somewhere completely outside of know reality. This is a completely anti-hedonistic philosophy. We have no reason to believe that doing the Good will make life any sweeter, either for ourselves or others. In starkest contrast with the epicurian Diderot who warned us against the dangers of Theatre, which would seduce away from reality; for Kant "Reality" itself is nothing but a theatre of dreams of our own making. The goal of true philosophy here would be always to acknowledge that the world is our own creation, and to strive to think and act in such a way that the sum of our actions will produce a narrative with the most coherent and inclusive possible plot.

Our lives, according to this view of things, are not simply a string of events, either arbitrarily or necessary linked together, but rather a constant struggle to create Beauty and Meaning despite the fact that we have been given no instructions manual whatsoever. In this kind of abstract and expressionist reality, each person's Life is nothing but a work of Art. And what keeps each of us alive is not money or food or clothing or shelter, but rather, in the most transcendental and aesthetic sense, sheer Interest. Thus the main causes of death are primarily two:

1) BOREDOM, when we simply decide to stop writing our lives because it's no longer interesting--Lack of Interest.

2) FEAR, when the struggle to continue living in a constant state of improvisation, or suspense becomes too much for us, and we simply drop the pen, or jump to the end of the book and read the last page to see how the story ends--Excess of Interest.

The alternative to these extremes, for Kant, lies in between these two, not as a happy balance of but instead in a state of perpetual ANXIETY. Enlightenment, here, is no longer the beaming and acquiescent optimism of Voltaire's Candide, who assumes all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Rather, Kantian Enlightenment depends upon each individual's ability to maintain a firmness of judgment and will sufficient for clarity of mind and dignity of conduct in the midst of a world in which their are no guarantees.

OLYMPIA




From the collection of wax anatomical specimens at Museo La Specola in Bologna, Italy.

(click here to go their site)

School fills my days.

And nights.

To A Student:

Your interest, now that I have seen more, seems to be in suggesting that your program include a practical introduction to the business of politics. In a number of ways, that is still very much tied to Mill's utilitarianism.

Nothing wrong with that. But if you want to take things in a more Kantian direction, the way to do that will be by discussing the importance of recognizing, nurturing and directing enthusiasm in Poly Sci students - something which the large-scale management of students tends to deaden, not to mention the treating of politics as a kind of organizational behavior.

Consequently, you'll want to emphasize how the course you propose will entails real-life situations with genuine outcomes and political consequences. The point of this would be for students to experience the feeling of risk which should always be a part of political engagement, something which Mill's system is set up to minimize through careful distribution of responsibilities over the broadest possible field. Also, you'll want to talk about how close work with mentors will help students not just information for reliable sources, but beyond this, develop moral confidence in concerned and competent leaders after whom they can model themselves.
Recall that the notion of vocation comes from Kant, and you can read about it in What is Enlightenment? Schelling's emphasis is also in calling, in his case calling being tide to investigation within a particular field. The way a student will feel this necessary enthusiasm and call will have to do with the teacher's ability dramatically to restage the various phases a specific fields historical of development within the classroom.

This is tied to his theory of recapitulation in which the development of the individual should parallel that of the species. In seeing the organic development of a given field of research, the student should feel a sense of wonder and curiosity, which will translate into a desire to research. But of course none of this can ever take place in the student if the discipline itself is presented merely as a loose array of facts and isolate courses. The program, for Schelling, must genuinely be a program: one continuous course of inwardly driven and systematic development.
That said, here is an article on Kant's philosophy of university studies and free inquiry. Notice in it, if you choose to read it, how much emphasis is placed on the universe as an autonomous and self-regulating whole: in other words, the university is an organism. This is precisely why, when we read Schelling, I emphasized the importance of the physical maintenance of buildings and grounds on campus; because the university, like any other organism, has a body which is its expressive vehicle. But enough of that.

Letter To My Guru


N-

Glad you could get through my dense description of that first paper. As my students will attest, I can be a bit opaque. The journal post from the second student is a lot more straightforward and readable though. So you see, I've managed not to ruin these poor kids entirely. I'll share just one more journal entry with you.

I think a comparison might be made between what Yoga Nidra and Virginia Woolf. Yoga Nidra brings an incredible sense of calmness, clarity, and quietness and you become the "vessel of this perplexed liquid, this cloudy, yeasty, precious stuff, the soul. The soul is not restrained by barriers" (Woolf "The Common Reader"). Meaning in life, the way I understand it, cannot be reached through philosophical reasoning but rather through the imagination. In Woolf's writing she explores the idea of the real world behind the visible world. While participating in this type of Yoga, I think that is exactly what the mind is able to do.
As you can probably tell, I want my students not to see school as an inherent good, but rather to use it as a means toward the experience of something far better than just facts and grades and a very expensive piece of paper. Thanks again for joining me in that intention. You did these kids a great service, one they'll remember a very long time.

Y-